

# Mexico, the Consummation of American Independence

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## (i) SILVER AND SOCIETY

The Spanish American revolutions were continental in scale but not concerted in movement. They shared a common origin and a common objective, but they differed from each other in political and military organization; prisoners of their particular environment, they failed to synchronize their efforts against Spain. In general Spanish American independence had to contend with two enemies and a potential ally—the armies of Spain, the opposition, or inertia, of the creoles, and the embarrassing demands of popular forces. None of these factors alone could permanently impede the revolution, but in conjunction they could constitute a powerful obstacle; and when the creoles' fear of the American populace caused them to prefer the protection of the Spanish army, independence could not make progress without external stimulus. Some countries like the Rio de la Plata were in a position to provide stimulus; others like Peru depended on receiving it. But external stimulus was not always available or acceptable. Cuba neither wanted nor received it.

Cuba's expanding sugar economy depended on slave labour, the supply of which in turn depended on the continuation of Spanish rule. The demographic strength of the Negroes, moreover, recalling as it did the black revolution in Haiti, deterred the white aristocracy from promoting change and persuaded them to place their trust in a reformed colonial administration backed by strong military force. As for outside intervention, in the absence of a local revolutionary nucleus, Cuba was more easily defended than attacked. So too was Puerto Rico, an island fortress dominated by its military establishment and virtually immune to invasion, at least to any invasion which

the new states might be capable of launching. Cuba and Puerto Rico remained Spanish enclaves in an independent America.

Mexico was different and constituted yet a further challenge to the American revolution. Divided over objectives, torn by internal conflict, Mexico was a suitable case for outside intervention. Yet it could not receive it. Remote from the great centres of revolution in the south, beyond the reach of the continental liberators, Mexico fought alone and its struggle was self-generated. The Mexican revolution differed from those in South America in two vital respects: it began as a violent social protest from below; and Spain had more to lose in Mexico than anywhere else in America.

Mexico was pure colony. Spaniard ruled creole, creole used Indian, and the metropolis exploited all three. Liberation would be arduous in this the most valuable of all Spain's possessions. In the course of the eighteenth century Mexican silver production rose continuously from five million pesos in 1702, past the boom of the 1770s and an increase from twelve million to eighteen million pesos a year, to a peak of twenty-seven million in 1804. By this time Mexico accounted for 67 per cent of all silver produced in America; and the most successful zone, Guanajuato, was the leading producer of silver in the world, its annual output of over five million pesos amounting to one-sixth of all American bullion. A unique concurrence of circumstances created this great boom—excellent bonanzas, improved technology, consolidation of mines under larger ownership, lowering of production costs by government reduction of gunpowder and mercury charges and fiscal exemption.<sup>1</sup> Then, from the 1780s, the industry received large injections of merchant capital, a byproduct of a further development in the colonial economy.

In 1789 *comercio libre* was at last extended to Mexico, thus ending the monopoly long exerted by the consulados of Cadiz and Mexico City. New merchants entered the field with less capital but more enterprise. Competition lowered prices for the consumer; it also lowered profits. The old monopolists therefore

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began to withdraw their capital from trans-Atlantic trade and to seek alternative outlets which promised better returns. They reinvested in agriculture, mining and finance, with results advantageous to the economy and to themselves. Mexico contained some immense private fortunes. In Caracas a man was rich if he had a yearly income of ten thousand pesos from commercial agriculture; in Peru, with its depressed mining and stagnant agriculture, few families had more than four thousand pesos. In Mexico there were people, even outside of mining, with an annual income of two hundred thousand pesos. In some years the Valenciana mine yielded more than a million pesos profit to its owners, the Counts of Valenciana, a family which came to the colony as poor immigrants.<sup>2</sup> The fortunes could be as quickly lost as won; but mining, risky to individuals, was the life-blood of the colony and the life-line of the metropolis.

The other pillar of the Mexican economy was the hacienda. Many haciendas were too big to be efficient units of production. Wasteful of land and lacking the stimulus of a large market, they rarely gave a good return on investment; and they were usually mortgaged to the Church, paying 5 per cent in annual interest in addition to tithes and taxes. The hacienda was essentially a social investment which soaked up the profits of mining and commerce and helped to ruin many a creole family.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless it supported an absentee landlord and his resident manager in a style to which they were accustomed, while their campesinos lived close to starvation. For the hacienda monopolized land and was responsible for rural inequality and deprivation. On the fringes of the great estates, it is true, the little *pegujal* was to be found, a minifundia barely sustaining a single family. But the best lands in Chalco, Puebla, the Bajío and Toluca were owned by a relatively small group of Spaniards and creoles. The consequences of land monopoly were aggravated by population growth. Between 1742 (3.3 million) and 1793 (5.8 million) demographic growth reached about 33 per cent.<sup>4</sup> Between 1790 and 1810 the population rose from 4,483,564 to 6,122,354, evidence of rapid growth among the Indians, mestizos and other mixed groups. But there was no land for the new population, as creole and Church haciendas constantly encroached on smaller farms to remove competition and procure a dependent labour supply. The expansion of the haciendas and the growth of the rural population produced a situation in which the peasantry could not feed itself independently of the great estates. The landowners had the campesinos at their mercy, both as consumers and as labourers.

Between 1720 and 1810 Mexico suffered ten agricultural crises in which shortage of maize reached starvation level and prices far outstripped labourers' wages. The rural economy lacked a substitute for the staple maize; it endured periodic droughts and premature frosts; and it suffered from monopoly of production by the great haciendas which were able to force up prices by carefully controlling distribution. The secondary effects of famine were also savage-epidemics which devastated the people, especially the undernourished Indians and castes, and damage to other sectors of the economy.<sup>5</sup> The wage-price crises caused unemployment, uncontrolled flight to the towns, and social unrest which can be seen in rising urban crime statistics.<sup>6</sup> Impetus was given to rural banditry, the leaders of which were in some ways the true precursors of independence; such were the semi-brigand, semi-revolutionary creoles in western Michoacán who robbed Spaniards for robbing Mexico.<sup>7</sup> Banditry was symptomatic of a new resentment against hacendados, monopolists and speculators. Between 1778 and 1810 the masses suffered unprecedented misery from soaring maize prices, with particular crises in 1785, the year of hunger, and 1810, the year of revolution. The price of maize spiralled to 56 reales a fanega at a time when the daily wage of a labourer was 1 1/2 to 2 reales. It was now that the lower clergy, who were closest to the people, came to realize the desperate state of the campesinos and to appreciate the gross inequality of the agrarian structure. The Bishop of Michoacán, Fray Antonio de San Miguel, was convinced that the roots of rural distress went deeper than droughts and frosts, and that 'the maldistribution of land has been one of the principal causes of the people's misery'.<sup>8</sup> These views were shared by a number of enlightened creoles as the last years of the *pax hispánica* came to grief amidst the terrible droughts of 1808-9, followed by the famine years of 1810-11, when the average price of maize reached a second peak. The violence of Mexico's first revolution had its origins in the hunger and desperation of the Indian masses: 'The revolution for independence, like the French revolution, broke out in the middle of a storm of high prices.'<sup>9</sup>

The agrarian crises of the eighteenth century brought to the surface some of the contradictions in the colonial structure, for they occurred at a time when the economy in general was booming, and when plantation agriculture, mining and commerce were bursting with abundance. The growth of conspicuous wealth in the last decades of the old regime aggravated the inequalities of colonial society, as Humboldt noticed when he visited Mexico in 1803. The wealthy mine-owners and hacendados with their estates and mansions and ostentation, the higher

clergy with their sumptuous churches and palaces, all stood in horrifying contrast to the poverty of the greater part of the population and the condition of 'barbarism, abjection and misery' to which the Indians were reduced.<sup>10</sup>

The social structure was rigid. In a population of six million the 1,097,928 whites formed only 18 per cent of the whole and lived in a world far removed from the Indians (60 per cent) and castes (22 per cent). The basic distinction was wealth. Manuel Abad y Queipo, Bishop Elect of Michoacán, identified two groups in late colonial society, 'those who have nothing and those who have everything. . . . There are no gradations or mean; they are all either rich or poor, noble or infamous.'<sup>11</sup> Humboldt, too, observed 'that monstrous inequality of rights and wealth' which characterized Mexico.<sup>12</sup> Spaniards and creoles shared the wealth, though not the rights. In some ways it is misleading to distinguish between the two groups, for they often belonged to the same families and possessed the same interests. But in fact they were divided. The Spaniards numbered no more than fifteen thousand in 1800; they were concentrated in the capital and central Mexico; and about half of them were soldiers.<sup>13</sup> Many—perhaps the majority—were poorly educated and less affluent than the creoles, who had the richest haciendas and mines, and who outnumbered the Spaniards by about seventy to one. As a successful colony Mexico attracted many immigrants, but not all who came were wealthy merchants and bureaucrats or got rich so quickly from mining as the Count of Regla. Many immigrants were poor, though this very circumstance tended to make them a dynamic group who pushed their way into commerce and mining. Commerce was always controlled by Spaniards, though once the monopoly was broken by *comercio libre* they had to be content with less profits; still, they controlled the influential consulados, and their capital financed the textile industry. And they possessed an automatic privilege. As a matter of policy the metropolis ensured that a relatively small number of Spaniards monopolized higher office in the administration and the Church and controlled the judiciary.<sup>14</sup> This political power counterbalanced the local strength of the creoles; but as a small minority the position of the Spaniards depended absolutely on the continuing rule of the metropolis, and this explains why they had to move quickly and decisively in 1808.

There was, nevertheless, an aristocracy of mining, commerce and land-owning dominated by peninsulares. Of the fifty new titles of nobility granted in Mexico in the eighteenth century about a half went to mining and commerce, and 60 per cent to Spaniards. In Guanajuato, for example, immigrants

climbed up the social scale, getting first into trade then into mining and office, and passing inert creoles on the way.<sup>15</sup> A contemporary observed in 1763: 'It happens all the time that gachupín fathers leave their sons great fortunes in commerce and haciendas, and within a short time these are consumed or diminished.'<sup>16</sup> Contemporaries believed that creoles were idle and lived on their inheritance. And it is true that their position was ambiguous. They were an elite, superior to the coloureds, yet denied public office. They were averse to business and frustrated by the shortage of professional openings; mining could be risky, and the Spaniards controlled overseas trade. They had land, the basis of creole wealth, bought by their Spanish forbears from the profits of trade and mining, but limited in its earning capacity. And once the inheritance was consumed, or divided into ever smaller units by succeeding generations, life became a battle for survival, a struggle to keep up with the immigrant and out of the castes. For the creoles were constantly pressed from behind by more immigrants, who quickly got established as managers of stores, haciendas and mines, and whose sons procured positions in the militia and town councils. But they no sooner achieved hegemony than they were harassed by a new wave of immigrants, with whom they had to share power and opportunity. So rivalry was greatest between first-generation creoles and new Spaniards, and it was from the former that many revolutionary leaders were recruited. The creoles desperately needed office, and therefore they needed to control the government.

From the 1790s creole resentment was expressed in political agitation. In 1794 a small group of creoles plotted 'to raise the kingdom in the name of independence and liberty'. In 1799 a somewhat larger conspiratorial movement aimed at 'starting a revolution, throwing the Europeans out of the kingdom, and making the creoles masters of it'. The viceroy was worried enough to report to Madrid 'the ancient division and deep enmity between Europeans and creoles, an enmity capable of producing fatal results'.<sup>17</sup> The Cabildo of Mexico City had the greatest revolutionary potential. Here the creoles were a clear majority: 'The fifteen perpetual regidores were old mayorazgos, generally very deficient in learning and the majority of them with ruined fortunes. . . . Almost all of the perpetual regidores were Americans, having inherited their offices from their fathers, who had bought them in order to add lustre to their families; and therefore the ayuntamiento of Mexico City may be considered as the representative of that party.'<sup>18</sup> Among the *alcaldes* were a number of radical creole lawyers such as Francisco Primo de Verdad and Juan Francisco

Azcárate. But for the moment the ayuntamiento stayed its hand.

The Mexican Indians and Indianized mestizos comprised some 70 per cent of the population.<sup>19</sup> Culturally backward, brutalized, and living in physical and moral squalor, the indios were a sociocultural group rather than an exclusively racial one. A sign of their status was the tribute, paid by community Indians, mobile Indians, and also by free Negroes and mulattos. This provided a considerable revenue, and it was therefore in the crown's interest to identify and preserve a tributary class by keeping its members separate from the whites, prohibited from wearing Spanish clothes, owning a horse, and possessing weapons. Servile to the state, they were also subject to the colonial economy and formed a cheap labour pool for use in agriculture and public works. The Indians included many mestizos, whose cultural and economic position dragged them down into the underprivileged and impoverished indios, where they were accompanied by the mulattos and Negroes (some 10 per cent of the population). These were the underdogs of this hierarchical society, the simmering mass ready to explode at the call of a leader. For Mexico, as Humboldt bluntly remarked, was 'the country of inequality'.<sup>20</sup> And inequality, unless remedied, would lead to Indian and caste revolution. This at least was the forecast of Antonio de San Miguel, Bishop of Michoacán, one of the few spokesmen of the oppressed whose views anticipated those of the insurgents Hidalgo and Morelos:

Let the hated exaction, the personal tribute, be abolished. Abolish also the infamous laws which brand the people of colour. Let them occupy all the civil posts which do not require a special title of nobility. Let the communal lands be distributed among the natives; let part of the royal lands be given to the Indians and castes. Let there be adopted for Mexico an agrarian law . . . whereby a poor peasant can break up the lands which the large proprietors hold and which have been uncultivated for centuries to the detriment of the national economy. Let the Indians, castes and whites be given full freedom to live together in the towns, which now belong exclusively to only one of these classes.<sup>21</sup>

Revolutionary change of this kind, however, would subvert a system of exploitation and dependence in which all the propertied interests were involved—the state, Spaniards and creoles. Mexico was the most beneficial to Spain of all her colonies. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Mexican revenue amounted to no more than three million pesos a year. By the end of the century this had grown to fourteen million pesos a year. Of this, four million was appropriated for local

administration and defence, while a further four million subsidized other colonies in the Caribbean and North America. The remaining six million was pure profit for the royal Treasury in Madrid.<sup>22</sup> Spain received from Mexico two-thirds of her entire imperial revenue, and the amount increased during the late eighteenth-century silver boom. But prosperity only intensified Mexicans' resentment of their colonial status and of the continual exit of money to the metropolis; as Mora said, material progress and 'desire for independence went together'. On 12 December 1804 Spain declared war on Britain, and immediately raised her demands on the colonies. Mexico was an obvious target. A decree of 26 December ordered the sequestration of charitable funds in Mexico and their remission to Spain.

The Mexican Church had great capital resources. In particular the *juzgados*, or tribunals, of chantries and pious foundations possessed large financial reserves, accumulated over the centuries from bequests of the faithful. In putting this capital to work the *juzgados* became in effect a mixture of bank and building society, advancing money to merchants, hacendados and property owners, indeed to anyone wishing to raise a mortgage-type loan to cover purchase of property or other expenditure, the interest rate being 5 per cent a year. Capital rather than property was the principal wealth of the Mexican Church, and Church capital was the principal lubricant of the Mexican economy.<sup>23</sup> The metropolis was ignorant of both these facts: this was its ultimate folly. The *consolidación de vales reales*, as the sequestration was called, attacked the Church in its capital, where it really hurt. It also attacked the entire propertied class in the colony. Merchants and miners, hacendados and homeowners, the powerful and the wealthy, Spaniards as well as creoles, all suddenly had to redeem their mortgages and settle their debts with the *juzgados*. Protest and resistance were universal. More creoles were affected than Spaniards, though the latter made more noise, for the measure subverted their privilege and power. Perhaps the greatest hardship was suffered by a large number of medium and small proprietors, who could not assemble capital quickly enough and were forced to sell their property on highly unfavourable terms. Many substantial landowners had difficulty in repaying; a few had their estates seized and auctioned. The clergy were embittered, especially the lower clergy who often lived on the interest of the capital loaned. Bishop Abad y Queipo, who estimated the total value of *juzgado* capital invested in the Mexican economy at 44.5 million pesos, or two-thirds of all capital invested, warned the government that resistance would be strong.<sup>24</sup> He went in person to Madrid to request the

government to think again; Godoy gave him no satisfaction, but in due course the hated decree was in fact suspended, first on the initiative of the viceroy (August 1808), and then formally by the supreme junta in Seville (4 January 1809). Meanwhile the not insubstantial sum of twelve million pesos had been collected, and the officials who collected it, including the viceroy, shared five hundred thousand pesos in commission. The money was not actually sent to Spain until 1808-9, when she was no longer at war with Britain.<sup>25</sup>

The sequestration of Church wealth epitomized Spanish colonial policy in the last decade of empire. This careless and opportunist measure alerted the Church, damaged the Mexican economy, and caused one of the greatest crises of confidence in the history of the colony. In enforcing the policy Viceroy Iturrigaray broke the unity of the peninsular front in Mexico and turned many Spaniards against the administration. In reaction the viceroy became more partial towards the creoles. But these too were outraged. Mexicans saw this as the ultimate test of their dependence, the proof that they were 'colonials, born only to satisfy the insatiable greed of the Spaniards'.<sup>26</sup> They had to watch the spoliation of their country to subsidize a foreign policy in which they had no interest; as Fray Servando Teresa de Mier complained, 'the war is more cruel for us than for Spain, and is ultimately waged with our money. We simply need to stay neutral to be happy'.<sup>27</sup>

Mexico knew of the collapse of the Spanish monarchy by mid July 1808. The news sparked off a struggle for power between creoles and peninsulares, between the ayuntamiento on the one hand and the *audiencia* and *consulado* on the other.<sup>28</sup> Iturrigaray, an average viceroy, appealed for unity: 'We must stay united if we wish to be dominant'.<sup>29</sup> On 9 August he suspended the sequestration decree. When this failed to satisfy he made further overtures to creoles, appointing many to civil and military offices and allowing public discussion of the problem of sovereignty. Liberal creoles voiced their opposition to the authority of the junta in Spain. Juan Francisco de Azcárate argued that Mexico should refuse to subordinate itself to any Spanish junta. Francisco Primo de Verdad claimed that in the absence of the king sovereignty reverted to the people; and he proposed that a national junta be elected representing the *cabildos*, cathedral chapters and Indian communities. Fray Melchor de Talamantes held even more radical views and really sought creole power and national independence. The *Cabildo* of Mexico City took the position that during Ferdinand's imprisonment sovereignty should be transferred to the viceroyalty of New Spain, to be

exercised by the *audiencia* and *cabildos*. But the Spanish dominated *audiencia*, indeed all Spaniards in Mexico, rejected these views, convinced that they implied a move towards independence and that the viceroy who tolerated them had become a threat to their power and privilege. They therefore planned a preemptive *golpe* to remove the viceroy and his creole allies in the *ayuntamiento*.

The conspiracy was centred on the *audiencia* and the *consulado*, with the connivance of the Church hierarchy and the principal Spanish merchants and land-owners, many of whom had suffered from sequestration. The leader was Gabriel de Yermo, a wealthy Basque sugar planter from Cuernavaca, who had married into great creole wealth and had recently been pursued by the administration for two hundred thousand pesos under the sequestration decree.<sup>30</sup> The *golpistas* struck on 15 September 1808. The viceroy was seized and sent back to Spain; Primo Verdad, Azcárate and other creole radicals were imprisoned. Behind a front of compliant viceroys, the first of whom was a decrepit old soldier, Pedro Garibay, the Spaniards then imposed a hard-line administration, repressive towards creole suspects, partial towards themselves. They effected fiscal and commercial measures which favoured their own interests, eventually reaching agreement with the peninsula to pay extraordinary revenue in the form of loans, an acceptable alternative to sequestration. The military arm of the *golpe* was virtually a private army—the Volunteers of Ferdinand VII—a militia recruited from employees of the Spanish merchants, controlled by them, and constituting in effect an extra-constitutional guard.<sup>31</sup> In the provinces, too, Spanish interests made a preemptive strike after decades of frustration. In Oaxaca the Spanish merchants, alienated by the intendant system and all that it implied, seized power backed by their own militia.<sup>32</sup>

The Mexican revolution thus began as a Spanish reaction. The Spaniards thought it was the end; in fact it was only the beginning. The resulting creole and popular anger led directly to a new revolution in 1810. Creole conspirators, including a number of militia officers, plotted to oust the Spaniards. Popular unrest added a new dimension to the struggle, aggravated as it was by worsening conditions in the fields and the mines. A dry summer in 1809 severely reduced maize output and caused prices to quadruple. The *campesinos* suffered enormously, and so did other workers; the impact was felt in the mining industry, where mules could not be fed and many miners were laid off.<sup>33</sup> These reverses left a vivid impression in the Bajío, where the recent prosperity of mining, textiles and agriculture was brought to an

abrupt halt. And it was here that violent rebellion first exploded, under a leader who came from an old but minor Mexican family, and whose captains were first-generation Mexicans.

## (ii) THE INSURGENTS

Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, son of a hacienda manager, was a creole frustrated like the rest of his class, a priest who knew at first hand the degradation of the rural masses. He resigned from a successful, if worldly, academic career in the diocesan College of San Nicolás Obispo in Valladolid to become a rural priest. In 1803, now middle-aged, 'of dark complexion, with lively green eyes, rather bald and white-haired' as Alamán described him, he became parish priest of Dolores in the Bajío.<sup>34</sup> He wore his personal religion lightly, lacking perhaps a true vocation and becoming the father of two children. Yet he was accessible and egalitarian, and he could speak Indian dialects. He made his parish the centre of discussions on contemporary social and economic matters, attended by poor Indians and castes as well as creoles. He organized a minor industrial programme to stimulate native manufacture for a local market—pottery, silk, tanning, weaving and viticulture—a sign of his concern for the poor and his anxiety to improve conditions. The Bajío was a relatively prosperous mining-agricultural complex, self-sufficient, having a looser social structure than elsewhere, a greater proportion of mobile, as distinct from community, Indians, and a higher percentage of free Negroes and mulattos.<sup>35</sup> While no one actually starved in the Bajío, there was stark contrast between the wealth of mine-owners and hacendados and the poverty of the tributary class, people who were mobile enough to find wage-work in mines and haciendas but whose progress was permanently impeded by the degrading tribute.

The Indians depended upon creole leadership for political action. But did the creoles want the Indians? From late 1809 a conspiratorial movement rallied a number of creole revolutionaries—Ignacio Allende, son of a wealthy Spanish merchant and now a militia officer, Juan de Aldama, another officer, Miguel Dominguez, an official, and other members of enlightened creole families of middle rank. They were moved by hatred of peninsulares: they wanted to depose the authorities, expel the Spaniards and establish a creole ruling junta. By mid-1810 the Querétaro conspiracy, as it came to be called, had recruited Hidalgo and he soon became its leader.<sup>36</sup> As a priest and a reformer he was indispensable to the conspirators; they needed someone with standing

among the Indians and castes who could rally these to a cause which had few positive attractions for them. For the Indians, whatever their respect for a distant king, distrusted creoles and peninsulares alike and could not distinguish between government by one or the other. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, needed forces quickly, and they could not get these from their fellow creoles, for the latter were not united on independence. The campesinos were the only alternative, with the advantage that they might ask less questions. Allende early advocated the inclusion of Indians in the revolt as a kind of fighting fodder: 'As the Indians were indifferent to the word liberty, it was necessary to make them believe the insurrection was being accomplished only in order to help King Ferdinand.'<sup>37</sup> This was a grave miscalculation, and many of the creole revolutionaries would live to regret the tiger which they unleashed. Hidalgo himself had no doubts and no regrets: he believed that an appeal to the Indians was not only necessary but just. And in the course of 1810 he had his workers making crude weapons.

In September 1810 two developments forced Hidalgo's hand. A new viceroy arrived, Francisco Javier de Venegas, veteran of the peninsular war and an uncompromising leader of the royalist cause. And the Querétaro conspiracy was discovered and destroyed. In Dolores Hidalgo now had to activate the revolution more quickly than had been planned, and as the creole revolutionaries were scattered he did not hesitate to appeal for mass support. At dawn on 16 September, taking advantage of the crowds from the surrounding country gathering in his parish for Sunday mass, he issued the *grito de Dolores*, a cry of rebellion which probably did not actually use the word independence but whose meaning was clear to succeeding generations of Mexicans. As the movement swept through the Bajío, thousands of campesinos rallied to its support; by mid-October the rebel horde numbered about sixty thousand. These recruits were chiefly Indians and castes, armed with bows and arrows, lances and machetes. After the fall of Guanajuato (28 September) they were reinforced by miners and other urban workers, but the movement never attracted more than about a hundred creole militia and a small minority of creole officers. Soon the cry was unequivocally 'independence and liberty'.

Hidalgo worked for popular support. His emphasis on the seizure of Europeans and their property, his abolition of Indian tribute (which forced the viceroy to do likewise by proclamation of 5 October 1810), and his invocation of the indigenous Virgin of Guadalupe, all were intended to give his movement mass appeal. Then the royalists themselves played into his hands by their defence of class interests at



Guanajuato, the wealthy mining town, where Intendant Juan Antonio Riaño, an otherwise enlightened and reforming administrator, made a gross error of judgement. Convinced that the lower sectors would defect, Riaño decided to cut his losses, to assemble the local militia, all the Europeans and some creoles, together with their property and the Treasury in the Alhóndiga, and to concentrate his defences there. This merely added to the impression of class conflict. As one observer reported: "The common people . . . began to mutter openly: that the *"gachupines y señores"* wanted to defend only themselves and leave them to be turned over to the enemy, and that even the food had been taken away so that they would perish of hunger.'<sup>38</sup> The manoeuvre was also tactically unwise; it simply made the granary a focus of Spaniards and money, doubly attractive to rebel attack. The attack came with uncontrolled violence, making Guanajuato an unforgettable symbol. The massacre and mutilation of the defenders, the killing of prisoners, creole and European alike, the massive pillage and assault on property, the wanton destruction of mining machinery, all proclaimed the socio-racial hatred animating the revolution. The violence

shocked the young Lucas Alamán; he was haunted by the 'monstrous union of religion with assassination and plunder, a cry of death and desolation', which echoed in his ears for the rest of his life.<sup>39</sup>

The creole-controlled Cabildo of Guanajuato issued a public statement after the massacre of three hundred peninsular Spaniards by the rebels: "Those abominable distinctions of creoles and gachupines . . . have never been made among the noble, cultivated and distinguished people of this city. The Europeans were our relatives, they were married to our daughters or sisters, they were our good friends and we did business with them. Our interests and wealth were mixed with theirs and indeed depended upon them absolutely. In their misfortune we were all involved."<sup>40</sup> But the fact remained that in Guanajuato most creoles were spared, to emphasize the distinction between the two groups. And in the west a vigorous, if untypical, force of creole rebels led by José Antonio Torres took Guadalajara and joined with the army of Hidalgo on 26 November. There followed an orgy of eating, drinking and killing; captured Spaniards were taken in groups of twenty or thirty every third night to the outskirts of the town

where they were quickly decapitated.<sup>41</sup> Meanwhile, in Mexico City, an underground organization of about twenty creoles from the professional classes came into being after the *grito de Dolores*; known as the *Guadalupes*, it existed to serve the revolution as an intelligence network and a channel of arms, information and propaganda.<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless creole participation remained on the periphery. Hidalgo's movement was essentially a mass movement and stood for basic revolution. He retained the allegiance of his supporters by constantly enlarging the social content of his programme.<sup>43</sup> He abolished the Indian tribute, the badge of an oppressed people. He also abolished slavery under pain of death. In Mexico, where slavery was a declining institution, abolition carried social rather than economic implications.<sup>44</sup> Land-owners had more efficient and more economical ways of working their land, preferring a peon labour force tied not by slavery but by tenure and indebtedness. So the real test of Hidalgo's intentions would be agrarian reform. This problem too he grasped, ordering the return of lands rightfully belonging to Indian communities:

I order the judges and justices of the district of this capital to proceed immediately to the collection of rents due up to today, by the tenants of the lands pertaining to the native communities, so that being entered in the national Treasury the lands may be delivered to the said natives for their cultivation, without being able to rent them in the future, then it is my will, that its use be only for the natives in their respective villages.<sup>45</sup>

The intention was to restore lands to Indians and prevent their alienation; this could not be accomplished by decree alone, and Hidalgo never in fact had the opportunity to establish machinery for implementing his policy. But this decree was not his last word on property. Like other commanders of the wars of independence, Hidalgo condoned pillage; he regarded it as a legitimate bait to attract the peasant masses to the revolution and to retain his following. So destruction and looting were endemic in the revolt. This was instant redistribution of property. Creole as well as European haciendas were robbed, and as the Indian hordes marched along they openly carried their plunder. In early November 1810 Ignacio de Aldama, one of the more timid of the creole officers, reported to Hidalgo: 'The Indians are very much out of control. On passing through the village of San Felipe I found three Europeans and a creole torn to pieces, although they held safe conducts from Your Excellency; and the Indians would not allow the priest to bury them. If these excesses are not

punished our cause will suffer, and when we do try to stop them the situation will be beyond our control.' Hidalgo replied, 'No, sir, we must be careful; we have no other arms but theirs with which to defend ourselves, and if we start punishing them we shall not find them when we need them.'<sup>46</sup>

Outside of the Bajío, however, Hidalgo did not succeed in finding even Indian supporters. The corporate and conservative Indian communities of Mexico and Puebla were less revolutionary material than the free and mobile people of the Bajío. And in general whoever reached the leaderless and apolitical Indians first could control them. The creoles worked on the masses to repudiate the revolt, and outside of the Bajío they had some success. The egalitarian doctrines and racial hatred, the attack on property and the sack of Guanajuato, the sheer size of the rebel hordes, caused a profound shock throughout the rest of Mexico and a wave of revulsion against the revolution. Hidalgo was condemned by the Church authorities and even by the reforming Bishop Abad y Queipo, who argued that it was creoles who suffered most in loss of property, labour and wealth, and that the revolution impeded Mexico's political progress. Among the lower clergy the movement had many sympathizers and from these it recruited officers for the peasant army and the guerrilla bands.<sup>47</sup> But the majority of Mexico's one million creoles opposed Hidalgo; his agrarian radicalism turned even anti-Spanish creoles into supporters of the colonial government. This forced him to commit himself exclusively to the peasantry and to take the revolution to further extremes, demonstrated not only by the reiteration of his earlier reforms but also by his execution of prisoners without trial, a procedure pressed upon him by his Indian followers.

Repudiated by the mass of the creoles, criticized even by his own creole officers, Hidalgo had little chance of military success. His eighty thousand followers were less an army than a horde, undisciplined and untrained, a positive obstacle to military operations. In the north Félix María Calleja, a professional Spanish soldier, organized the support of great land-owners and mine-owners of San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas, and created a small army officered largely by creoles. He easily prevented Hidalgo and Allende from expanding northwards and confined them to Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Guadalajara. The combination of Calleja's northern army with the regular and militia forces of the centre led by Manuel de Flon, was too much for Hidalgo. The royalist army was able to defend Mexico City, and on 17 January 1811, it routed Hidalgo's forces at the Bridge of Calderón. Hidalgo, Allende and the remnants of the rebels fled further and further north in a heroic

march which ended in treachery; they were ambushed and captured on 21 March 1811, taken in chains to Chihuahua and there executed. Six of the nine-man court which tried them were creoles. This was typical. It was the royalist creoles, frightened by Hidalgo, who saved Mexico for Spain. And creoles were subsequently promoted to high civil and military office. But they still had a rebellion on their hands, not a rampaging horde but a number of guerrilla bands led by military caudillos—Ignacio Rayón, Manuel Félix Fernández (Guadalupe Victoria), Vicente Guerrero, the Matamoros, the Bravo family. And there was a new leader.

The leadership of the social revolution passed to José María Morelos, another rural priest, one indeed whose career kept him even closer to the peasantry than Hidalgo and who remained more committed to the priesthood and to religion. Morelos was born on 30 September 1765 in Valladolid, Michoacán, of a poor mestizo family, his father a carpenter, half Indian, his mother a creole.<sup>48</sup> In his youth he worked on an uncle's hacienda, and later as a mule driver on the Acapulco-Mexico City route. In a great effort of self-improvement he took a degree of the University of Mexico and became a priest in 1797. He was appointed first to a parish in Churumuco, one of the most miserable parts of Michoacán in the heart of the *tierra caliente*, where the climate killed his mother, and then in 1799 to nearby Carácuaro, which was hardly better. As an underprivileged mestizo, therefore, Morelos got a poor parish in the backwoods; there he laboured for eleven years, underpaid, overworked, among a sullen and impoverished Indian population; and there he became father of two illegitimate children. Stocky, coarse and swarthy in appearance, Morelos had only a brief revolutionary preparation. After the *grito de Dolores*, disturbed by the ecclesiastical censure of Hidalgo, he sought out the insurgent, was convinced by his arguments and offered his services.<sup>49</sup> He was commissioned as a lieutenant to raise troops on the south coast and take the revolution to Acapulco. Starting from nothing in October 1810, within a year he created a small, well equipped and highly disciplined army; this he brilliantly deployed in southern Mexico, bringing most of the coast under his control; he failed to take Puebla and thereby cut communications with Veracruz, but in November 1812 he captured wealthy Oaxaca to the great consternation of the royalists.

Morelos tried to free the revolution of the encumbrance of the Hidalgo movement, whose anarchy and violence had presented the royalists with free propaganda. He preferred an effective and swift-moving fighting force of two to three thousand trained men to be used in guerrilla tactics. He could not deny his

troops booty and spoils, but he also tried to raise a legitimate revenue from reformed taxation of the areas which he held. He was merciless towards insubordination. And he preferred to use the Indian hordes in a supporting role. He reported in August 1811: 'I place my confidence in these troops, for they have been selected with my approval. . . . Supporting our cause are the natives of fifty towns. They number several thousand and while they are not disciplined they can serve well in a subordinate capacity. I have therefore sent these men back to their fields for the purpose of sustaining the troops.'<sup>50</sup> While he sought to reassure public opinion by the professionalism of his forces, Morelos also projected a wide social appeal, preaching a combination of Mexican nationalism and basic reform.

Morelos was the most nationalist of all the early revolutionaries, and his nationalism seems to have been based not on careful calculation of the degree of maturity reached by Mexico but on an instinctive belief in Mexico's independence. Unlike his principal rival, Rayón, he dropped the use of Ferdinand's name either as a mask or otherwise, and spoke frankly of independence. The revolution was justified, according to Morelos, because the hated Spaniards were enemies of mankind, who for three centuries had enslaved the native population, stifled Mexico's national development, squandered its wealth and resources; and one of his basic objectives was that no Spaniard should remain in the government of Mexico. To the creoles in Calleja's army he addressed another argument: 'When kings are absent, sovereignty resides solely in the nation; and every nation is free and entitled to form the type of government which it pleases, and not to remain the slave of another.'<sup>51</sup> Morelos's nationalism was also inspired by the military struggle and was formed in the harsh conditions of guerrilla warfare. He strove to evoke the spirit of a national army. On the grim march to Valladolid, before a battle which was to be disastrous, he issued a moving manifesto to his troops:

The gachupines have always sought to abase the Americans to the point of regarding us as brutes, incapable of initiative or even of the waters of baptism, and therefore useless to Church and state. But I see the opposite. Americans make first-class ecclesiastics, judges, lawyers, artisans, farmers, and in the present case soldiers. In the course of three and a half years I have learned, and everyone has seen, that the Americans are soldiers by nature; and it can be truly said that in my army at least any veteran soldier could fill the office of general.<sup>52</sup>

Morelos's nationalism also had profound religious content. In Mexico the Virgin of Guadalupe was a

national as well as a religious symbol; it demonstrated that God had shown a particular predilection for Mexico and it confirmed a sense of Mexican identity. Morelos saw independence almost as a holy war in defence of religious orthodoxy against the irreligious Bourbons and the idolatrous French. In Mexico, he asserted to the Bishop of Puebla, 'we are more religious than the Europeans', and he claimed to be fighting for 'la Religión y la Patria', and that this was 'nuestra santa revolución'.<sup>53</sup>

But Morelos made his greatest appeal to the masses. A royalist soldier, ex-prisoner of Morelos, reported on the insurgent army: 'None of them come from a decent family . . . there are Indians, Negroes, mulattos, and delinquents, fugitives from their homelands. When anyone presents himself for service they ask him "que patria?", and he has to reply "la patria".'<sup>54</sup> The nationalism of Morelos had a social content which was rare at the time. In his proclamation issued at Aguacatillo in November 1810 he declared: 'All the inhabitants except Europeans will no longer be designated as Indians, mulattos or other castes, but all will be known as Americans.'<sup>55</sup> This was the first attempt in Mexico to abolish the legal framework of caste distinctions and to make national identity the only test of a man's status in society. Morelos also decreed the abolition of Indian tribute and of slavery. During his conquest of the south he repeated these policy statements and again proposed absolute social equality through abolition of race and caste distinctions. He also proclaimed that the lands should be owned by those who worked them, and the campesinos should receive the income from those lands. In a controversial document, the *Medidas Políticas*, he appeared to go even further, advocating the destruction, confiscation and redistribution of property belonging to the wealthy, whether lay or ecclesiastical, creole or European. But it is open to question whether Morelos was the author of the *Medidas Políticas*; in any case this was essentially a military plan of devastation, not a long-term social programme.<sup>56</sup>

Social liberation first required political liberation, and the immediate objective of Morelos was to destroy the colonial regime: 'To destroy the tyrannical government and its satellites, check its greed by the destruction of the means by which it wages war, and strip the rich of the funds with which the government is supported.'<sup>57</sup> The programme which he placed before the Congress of Chilpancingo, a small body hand-picked by Morelos to reorganize the revolution, was essentially political, providing for absolute independence, support for the Catholic religion sustained by tithes, respect for property, representative and republican institutions, separation of powers

and a strong executive, with offices reserved for Americans.<sup>58</sup> But he also called for the abolition of slavery, of the tribute, of privileges and of all distinctions between classes. On 5 October 1813 he issued a second and definitive decree abolishing slavery, and this was endorsed by congress. The Declaration of Independence was formally made on 6 November 1813. Congress was less than enthusiastic about Morelos's social policy, though in the following year the attempt to impose a tax system graduated according to income was in his line of thought. But by now time was running out. The revival of royal power, the military reverses of Morelos, his demotion by congress, and his underground existence as a hunted guerrilla prevented the great revolutionary from further elaborating his social objectives and from producing a plan of agrarian reform before his tragic end.

The failure of Morelos can be explained to some degree in political and military terms. On 4 March 1813 Calleja replaced Venegas. The new viceroy was a tough, pulque-drinking officer who understood Mexicans, had his interests in the colony, and was determined to destroy the insurgents even if Mexico suffered 'blood and fire' in the process. He had previously had his hands tied by Spanish constitutionalism, which did not recognize the office of viceroy, and which caused a split between the conservative and liberal wings of the royalists, and to some extent between Spanish absolutists and creole constitutionalists.<sup>59</sup> In order to keep the creoles in line Calleja ruefully applied the constitution with the exception of freedom of the press. But in 1814 the restoration of Ferdinand VII and of absolutism produced a new hard line. Spaniards regarded this as a vindication of their position in the colony. And Calleja was free to make all-out war on Morelos; as he won ground, he sent hundreds of Mexicans to the firing squad. Morelos was now on the run. In spite of his brilliance as a guerrilla leader he had made some elementary strategical mistakes, one of which was to waste seven months in 1813 taking the fortress of Acapulco, leaving the royalists free to reduce the pockets of resistance in the north and then to turn south from a position of strength. But in the final analysis Morelos failed because, like Hidalgo, he did not receive creole support. Unlike Hidalgo, he earnestly sought it.

Early in the revolution Morelos made a special appeal to the creoles and promised those who supported him not only that their property would be respected but that high civil and military offices would be placed in their hands. Unlike many guerrilla chiefs, he tried to enforce strict discipline and tolerated no insubordination on socio-racial issues. From the beginning of his campaign he saw the

danger of a caste war which 'would be the cause of our total ruin, spiritual and temporal'. He ordered that the property of even the enemy and the guilty rich could be confiscated only on the express orders of commanders.

The whites are the principal representatives of the kingdom, and they were the first to take up arms in defence of the Indians and other castes, allying with them; therefore the whites ought to be the object of our gratitude and not of the hatred which some people are stirring up against them. . . . It is not our system to proceed against the rich simply because they are rich, much less against the rich creoles. Let no one dare to attack their property, no matter how rich they are.<sup>60</sup>

It was only in the final stages, under the provocation of royalist terrorism, that Morelos adopted incendiaryism and war to the death. After the defeat of Valladolid and in reaction to the royalist practice of shooting prisoners, he issued orders to kill all military prisoners and to devastate collaborationist villages and haciendas.<sup>61</sup>

While Morelos had been tied down at Acapulco, Calleja had used the respite to regroup the royalist troops and incorporate reinforcements from Spain. In December 1813 the insurgent forces suffered a grievous defeat at Valladolid, followed by a further mauling at Puruarán. Congress now became a wandering body, as preoccupied with evading capture as with legislating; nevertheless it took over executive power from Morelos, while in other sectors the rebels squabbled among themselves and became easy targets for the royalist army. Congress now made a last effort to win creole support by offering them an alternative to post-restoration Spanish despotism: the Constitution of Apatzingán (22 October 1814) was a frankly liberal document which provided for an independent and republican form of government, with a plural executive and powerful legislative.<sup>62</sup> Morelos considered the constitution 'impracticable'; and in truth it made little impact on events. During 1815 congress was hard pressed to keep one move ahead of royalist forces. Eventually it decided to move eastwards to Tehuacan and the coast, perhaps with the intention of cutting the Veracruz-Mexico City road. The escort was entrusted to Morelos, and he was soon in action. Caught by a royalist force, he fought a brave rearguard action which enabled congress to escape, but he himself was captured and taken to the capital. He was found guilty of heresy and treason and shot on 22 December 1815, his last days sadly clouded by the demoralization he suffered from the false charge of heresy.

The creoles did not respond to Morelos: they did not want independence on his terms, involving social as well as political change. After his defeat the cause of independence receded, undermined first by bloody repression then, after 1816, by a policy of amnesty. In the south a solitary resistance was continued by Vicente Guerrero; but Guadalupe Victoria had to go underground, without an army. The counter-revolution was essentially the work of royalist creoles; the Spanish minority could not have kept Mexico for Spain without them. The colonial army was a creole army; the administration was increasingly a creole preserve; in the period 1815-21 the creoles at last came into their own, and it was they who maintained social control and colonial values. They formed with the Church the most conservative force in Mexican society. They were in a position to reject Spain should the latter deviate or neglect their interests.

At this point it would appear that royalism in Mexico had achieved the same stability as that in Peru and could not be undermined without external intervention. In Mexico, however, intervention came not from American liberators but from imperialist liberals. This was the ultimate irony of Spanish rule in America.

### (iii) THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION

Spain itself was the first to disturb the delicate balance of interests which ruled Mexico. On 1 January 1820 General Rafael Riego led a liberal revolt in the peninsula; on 9 March Ferdinand was forced to restore the constitution of 1812 and to reconvene the cortes. News of these events reached Mexico late in April. On 27 May Viceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca proclaimed the constitution in the colony, and in September Mexican deputies were elected for the cortes in Spain. The new Spanish regime, in a kind of death wish, proceeded to subvert the very empire which it proclaimed. The cortes was a more radical body than its predecessor of 1812-14, and it quickly alienated the most powerful interests in Mexico. The Church was the first target. In a series of decrees issued in August and September 1820 it restricted the Church's right to own property by prohibiting the establishment of new chantries and pious foundations; it expelled the Jesuits and suppressed all monastic and hospital orders; it abolished the ecclesiastical fuero in all criminal cases; it ordered the bishops to comply, and ordered the arrest and confiscation of property of known opponents of the constitution, including the Bishop of Puebla and other prelates.<sup>63</sup> These anti-clerical decrees were known in Mexico, if not applied, in January 1821;

naturally they provoked the Church. Secular interests too were alerted. The extension of suffrage to all but Indians and castes led to the election of popular ayuntamientos and threatened the creole oligarchy's control of municipal government.<sup>64</sup> The abolition of mayorazgos, repartimientos and all forms of forced labour attacked the interests of land-owners. The limitation of the jurisdiction of the audiencias and suppression of special tribunals and fueros alienated the judiciary and holders of privileges. A policy of this kind would need the backing of a loyal army. But the cortes promptly deprived itself of military support: a law of 29 September 1820 abolished the colonial militia's privilege of trial by military courts in non-military cases; and in June 1821, after many months' fanfare, the complete *fuero militar* of the colonial army was abolished. As Iturbide later declared, 'the cortes seemed determined to lose these possessions.'<sup>65</sup> The interest groups reacted strongly. Once the creole oligarchy were convinced that Spain could no longer guarantee aristocratic control, as they had already seen that by herself alone she could not maintain social order, they were prepared to promote independence in order to preserve their colonial heritage. They found their leader in the creole Agustín de Iturbide, Catholic, land-owner, and officer.

The son of a Basque merchant in Valladolid, Iturbide was born in 1783, the same year as Bolívar. After a pious Catholic education, he began to manage a prosperous hacienda belonging to his father, and at about the same age—fifteen—he became a militia officer in his native province.<sup>66</sup> He was a man at harmony with his environment, and when the rebellion exploded in 1810 he immediately volunteered for the royal service, his determination confirmed when his own haciendas were occupied by the insurgents. From 1810 to 1816 he fought the insurgents without mercy, indeed without humanity; from his personal point of view the only flaw in the campaign was his failure to secure adequate reward and promotion. He later claimed that he made war not on Mexicans but on rebels who were set 'to exterminate the Europeans, to destroy property, to commit excesses, to flout the laws of war and humane customs, and even to disregard religious practices'.<sup>67</sup> Whatever the truth, Colonel Iturbide was a model of the creole position: he abhorred social revolution and helped to destroy it, without being completely satisfied with the Spanish regime, partly perhaps because he was a Mexican, principally because he was frustrated in his prospects.

In 1820 Iturbide was appointed commander of the royalist army of the south with a commission to defeat Guerrero and the remaining guerrillas. He

went through the motions of fighting but in the course of the campaign, by December 1820, he began to elaborate a plan of independence, stressing the need to avoid bloodshed and expressing concern for the Catholic religion. By February 1821 his mind was made up, and on 24 February he published the *Plan de Iguala*, devised by himself but representing the interests of those who were threatened by Spain and whose collaboration he quickly received—the Church, the army, and the oligarchy. Independence was declared for a Catholic, united nation, in which Spaniards and Mexicans would be equal, caste distinctions abolished, and offices open to all inhabitants: 'All inhabitants of New Spain, without any distinction between Europeans, Africans and Indians, are citizens of this monarchy, with access to all positions according to their merits and virtues.'<sup>68</sup> The Plan called upon Spaniards to accept Mexico as their patria. And of Mexicans it asked 'Who among you can say he does not descend from Spaniards?' The answer, of course, was simple—most of the population. But the new regime was intended for acceptance by the masses, not for their benefit. The Plan guaranteed the existing social structure. The form of government would be constitutional monarchy. Church property, privileges and doctrines were preserved. Property rights and offices were assured to all those who held them, with the exception of opponents of independence. The Plan of Iguala thus created the three guarantees of 'union, religion, independence'. Independence, as Alamán pointed out with approval, was 'accomplished by the same people who until then had been opposing it'. And even creole liberals like Mora approved of Iturbide as they had disapproved of Hidalgo.<sup>69</sup> But the outcome was a bitter disappointment to the real revolutionaries who, after long years of struggle, had to accept independence on terms far removed from their own ideals. Guerrero ruefully signed the Plan as the best of limited options and as a means to better things. And his troops helped to swell the 'army of the three guarantees', which was the sanction behind the new regime. As for the royalist army, most of it deserted the viceroy and went over to Iturbide.

The Spanish government was not impressed; it appointed a liberal general, Juan O'Donojú as Superior Political Chief of New Spain, with orders to enforce the constitution. O'Donojú reached Mexico at the beginning of August breathing liberal sentiments, unaware that these were the last things the Mexican ruling class wanted to hear. He soon learned. He signed the Treaty of Córdoba (24 August 1821), recognizing Mexico as 'a sovereign and independent nation', and he undertook to recommend the Plan of Iguala to the Spanish government. But he

died in October; and as Spanish governments, whether liberal or conservative, were all imperialist, the Treaty of Córdoba was rejected as invalid. Meanwhile on 28 September the 'trigarantine' army formally occupied Mexico City and set up a provisional government consisting of a five-man regency headed by Iturbide and a larger junta.

There could be little real unity. The majority of Mexicans were not prepared to tolerate Spaniards on these terms. So the Spanish minority, having backed Iturbide's movement, found that once they had severed connections with the metropolis, Iturbide could not protect them. They were hounded out of office, and the creoles assumed absolute control of government.<sup>70</sup> The masses, of course, received virtually nothing from the Plan of Iguala. Yet the popular reaction was not overtly hostile. Why should the mass of the people support the privileges of a small minority and endorse the labour and property rights of the creole oligarchy? The influence of the Church was decisive.<sup>71</sup> The Church's absolute adhesion to Iturbide's movement was the essential guarantee of its success, for the Church brought in the Catholic masses who might query the interests of privilege and property but did not question the message received in sermons and from priests that Iturbide was the saviour of religion against impious Spain.<sup>72</sup> It would be difficult to assess popular reservations. They could be seen dimly in the nostalgic sympathy for Hidalgo and Morelos, the real heroes of the masses, and in the publication of works on Morelos, the 'American martyr'.<sup>73</sup> The attitude of the Indians ranged from mild support, to hostility, to a more characteristic indifference.

The junta of thirty-eight men was drawn exclusively from the aristocracy of Church and state; it included no one from the early insurgent movement and no republicans. On 28 September they signed the Declaration of Independence of 'the Mexican empire'. Iturbide was confirmed as chief executive and as president of the regency, and it was agreed that he should have the title of *alteza* (highness). But once congressional elections were held dissident voices were bound to be heard. Congress met in February 1822 and almost immediately divided into three political groups: Bourbonists, who favoured a constitutional monarchy with a Bourbon as king; Iturbidists, who also wanted a monarchy but backed the candidature of Iturbide; and republicans, who opposed the designs of the army to impose a monarchy of any kind. Iturbide was in a strong position, for the Bourbons enjoyed no popularity, the republicans were leaderless, and he was a victorious military commander. In Mexico City the army, spearheaded by Iturbide's own regiment, openly pressed his claims, and a mob was

whipped up shouting 'long live Agustín I'. On 19 May congress itself, frightened by 'popular' pressure and military menace, gave majority approval to Iturbide's election as 'constitutional emperor of the Mexican empire'. He became known as Agustín I or, as Bolívar described him, 'emperor by the grace of God and of bayonets'.<sup>74</sup> In a bizarre ceremony in the cathedral Agustín I was anointed and crowned hereditary monarch with a crown made in Mexico.

Congress imagined it was getting a constitutional monarch. This was not Iturbide's view; he was incapable of restraint, or of remaining above parties and politics. He was a military dictator, one of the first in Latin America. And his style of government was an early model of caudillism, a series of stop-gap measures. To reassure merchants and capitalists he reduced the *alcabala* from 16 to 6 per cent, suppressed liquor taxes and many other duties. When revenue inevitably dropped, he began to improvise, resorting to *donativos*, forced loans, paper money, foreign loans, the consequence of which was financial confusion and weak government. The emperor had no greater success on the political front. He alienated Bourbonists and republicans alike. And his relations with congress foundered on a number of issues—how to deal with opposition (the emperor favoured jailing), his use of veto, and financial control. On 31 October 1822 Iturbide dismissed congress and replaced it with a puppet 'instituent junta'. But there was a gap in his defences. Alamán jeered that his army had more officers and musicians than private soldiers. It also had a number of enemies.

There was bound to be a military problem. Officers were dissatisfied with promotion and pay. And Mexicans resented the continued presence of Spanish military, many of them provocative and mutinous, whom they regarded as incompatible with security and independence. The focus of trouble was Veracruz. The town was held by Mexicans but the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa was still occupied by a group of Spanish royalists, who thus controlled entry into Mexico's major port. The Mexican commander at Veracruz, Antonio López de Santa Anna, tried on his own initiative to subvert the royalist force. Insubordination combined with failure drew the angry attention of the emperor who removed Santa Anna in November 1822 and ordered him to report to the capital. Santa Anna thereupon revolted, enraged by this humiliating order which, he subsequently wrote, 'tore the bandage from my eyes. I beheld absolutism in all its power'.<sup>75</sup> He had been one of the first to support Agustín I. Now he worked for a republic against a despot who misgoverned and abused congress. With the republican General Guadalupe Victoria he devised the Plan of Veracruz (6 December 1822),

which demanded the deposition of Agustín I, restoration of congress, and the three guarantees. The imperial commander, General José Antonio Echávarri, was the next to defect. He too produced a plan, the Plan of Casa Mata (1 February 1823); this called for a new congress to take power from Agustín I, and meanwhile gave authority to provincial governments in each province. In February agreement was reached with royalists at Veracruz for a joint effort against the emperor. Thus opportunists, republicans and royalists all came together in a campaign which soon reduced Agustín I's power to Mexico City. The emperor lost his nerve: short of revenue, allies and ideas, he abdicated on 19 March 1823. His basic mistake had been to discard the real for the image, to become an imitation king instead of a unique caudillo. The Bishop of Puebla, an admirer and supporter, always advised him 'never to dismount from his horse', in other words to rule like the military dictator he was.<sup>76</sup> In the end he failed to remember this. In May he sailed for Italy in an English frigate. After a stay in England, he returned to Mexico a year later, hopeful of a comeback; he was taken and shot within two days of landing.

The fall of Iturbide revealed the cracks in the union. The division between Bourbonists and Iturbidists favoured the republicans. In 1823 the Mexican revolution reached the point from which most of the other revolutions in Spanish America had started. But now that the republicans had their chance, they too were weakened by dissension. The principal division was between centralists and federalists, conservatives and liberals. The centralist and conservative forces in Mexican society consisted of the higher ranks of the clergy, military, merchants and landowners. Their most distinguished leader was Lucas Alamán. Opposed to them were the federalists, liberals and provincials, standing for a mixture of ideology and interests, including regional industrial interests damaged by the economic policy of the central government. In spite of the revolution for independence, central power was still absolute and corporate privilege still intact. Liberal federalists wanted to reduce the power of Mexico City, to substitute local militia for a standing army, to restrain the sovereignty of central government by state rights. As can be seen in the thought of José María Luis Mora, ecclesiastic turned reformer, the heart of the liberal programme was opposition to corporate privilege; liberals sought to free Mexico from colonial *fueros* and to create a new society inspired by the philosophy of utilitarianism and modelled on the institutions of the United States.<sup>77</sup> Mexican liberalism did not involve a rejection of Hispanic values in preference for those of France, Britain and the United States; on the

contrary it derived much of its character from the Spanish Enlightenment and from the Cortes of Cadiz. And it operated within the existing framework of society. On many of the basic issues confronting Mexico—social structure, landed property—the distance between liberals and conservatives was not great. Indeed on economic development and industrialization there were no clear party attitudes, though the Mexican most alive to entrepreneurial values and needs, Lucas Alamán, was a pure conservative.

The forces ousting Iturbide called a constituent assembly, which drew up a republican constitution (October 1824) representing the major interests. On the one hand it was federal; it created nineteen states and gave them substantial rights. But this was not a deviation from Mexican tradition in favour of something imported from the United States. It responded to the latent regionalism of Mexico and provincial distrust of Mexico City; it continued the impetus given to federalism by the Spanish constitution and the cortes of 1812-20; and it reflected regional economic interests, especially the artisan industries of the provinces threatened by the competition of foreign imports.<sup>78</sup> In any case, after the fall of Iturbide there was no central government; therefore in coming together to create one the provinces naturally protected themselves. While the constitution was federal, it was also conservative: it established Catholicism as the official religion, abolished the most important anticlerical decrees of the cortes of 1820, and, in article 154, specifically retained the *fueros* of the Church and the army. As Juárez later commented, the Constitution of 1824 was 'a compromise between progress and reaction'. Guadalupe Victoria, a respected symbol of resistance to the colonial order, was elected first constitutional president with the support of the liberals of the revolution. He in turn sought to establish a consensus government, including the conservative Lucas Alamán and the liberal federalist Miguel Ramos Arizpe. With the help of loans from the London money market, he provided a kind of stability until 1827.

Mexico assumed its national identity without the provinces to the south. Central America had followed a less violent way to independence. Its grievances had been real enough. Lacking an industrial or mining sector, Guatemala had become a backwater of empire, its economy dependent upon declining indigo exports, its affairs neglected by the metropolis. A minority of whites lived on the labour of a mass of Indians, mestizos and mulattos, while the whites themselves were divided by conflict between creoles who possessed mediocre land and Spaniards who monopolized lucrative office. In 1811-12 Mexican insurgency had repercussions in

Guatemala and there were revolts in San Salvador, León and Granada. But the local aristocracy and hacendados, men like José del Valle, held aloof and continued to collaborate with the Spanish authorities, first with the constitutional regime and then, from 1814, with the absolutist Ferdinand VII. The Spanish liberal revolution of 1820, however, restored constitutionalism to Guatemala-elected town councils, provincial deputations, representation in the Spanish cortes, constitutional guarantees. Many Guatemalans believed that this was unrealistic in a society composed largely of illiterate peasants, and their reaction to Spanish liberalism was similar to that of Iturbide and the Mexican elite. The Plan of Iguala, therefore, had admirers in Guatemala. In any case it could not be ignored, and Governor Gabino Gainza was not a man to defend a dying empire. Political instability unleashed social unrest, agitation among the *pueblo bajo*, rising crime rates, and Indian rebellion in 1820, all of which frightened men like Valle and caused them to believe that Spain was no longer capable of protecting them or preserving the social order. If they themselves did not seize the opportunity and control events, popular forces would do so. This was their fear. So independence was a case of self help; it was declared by governor Gainza and the provincial aristocrats 'to prevent the consequences that would be fearful in the event that the people should proclaim it'.<sup>79</sup>

But what was Guatemala? While a few patriots stood for outright independence, the majority of the people had only a faint sense of identity. Individual provinces began to declare union with Mexico, thus proclaiming the disunity of Guatemala. The impoverished and unstable condition of their country, combined with military threat from Iturbide, who regarded Guatemala as a colony of Mexico, led Guatemalans to seek the protection of their more powerful neighbour and to trade their independence for a place in the emperor's sun. In January 1822 a majority of town councils voted to annex Guatemala to Mexico in the expectation of joining a going concern and of profiting from representation in the Mexican congress. But the move was a miscalculation, for Mexico was hardly more stable than Guatemala; in Mexico Guatemalan representatives suffered from Iturbide's growing despotism and saw in their new metropolis all Guatemala's problems writ large. Annexation was a failure, Guatemala withdrew, and in July 1823 a National Constituent Assembly declared the absolute independence of the five provinces of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador, confederated as the United Provinces of Central America. The union soon fell into anarchy and civil war, as conservatives fought liberals, the periphery fought the

centre, and the provinces fought each other. By 1838 Central America had disintegrated into quintuple confusion.

#### (iv) NEW MULE, SAME RIDER

Mexico was badly damaged by the war of independence. Perhaps as many as six hundred thousand people perished, 10 per cent of the population. Mining production fell to less than a quarter, agriculture to a half, industry to a third. Commerce with Europe and the far east was disrupted. From stagnation and recession the people suffered, and so did the government. At the end of 1823 the financial administration was declared to be in complete disorder.

Commercial emancipation quickly followed political independence. A decree of 15 December 1821 opened Mexico to trade with all nations at a uniform tariff of 25 per cent. Most of the Spanish merchants withdrew either to Spain or to Cuba and were replaced by foreigners, mainly British and Americans, who began to supply the retailers of the interior directly without intervention of middlemen. The Americans were the most successful, bypassing the capital and thus avoiding glut and poor prices, and spreading out their products directly to the northern provinces through Tampico.<sup>80</sup> Postwar adjustment took some time, but by 1826 customs receipts were rising and shipping was increasing (399 United States ships in Mexican ports, 95 British), signs of recovery in Mexico's overseas trade. But it was imports, not exports, that accounted for the increase. Exports still consisted of precious metals and a few agricultural products—cochineal, indigo, vanilla, cotton and hides. Output had been severely damaged by wartime destruction and flight of capital.<sup>81</sup> Sugar production in Cuernavaca suffered, as did the fortunes of the planters: 'Most of these were Europeans, and as such, particularly obnoxious to the insurgents', who also blocked the way to markets.<sup>82</sup> Mexican industry could not compete in quality or price with foreign goods. The artisan manufactures of the provinces, the cotton and woollen textiles of Puebla and Querétaro, suffered three successive blows—*comercio libre* from 1789, flight of Spanish capital during 1810-21, and postwar British competition.<sup>83</sup> In 1827 a new tariff was imposed, ranging between 40 per cent duty and prohibition, but it was too late to stop the rot; and the law of 1829 prohibiting foreign goods that competed with native manufactures could not compensate for the absence of factors of production. Imports, therefore, were increasing, bringing with them a worsening balance of trade, barely covered by precious metals.

The departure of Spaniards meant the departure of capital. The exodus began as early as 1814 when two convoys of peninsulares sailed from Veracruz taking with them about twelve million pesos. But most of the Spanish capitalists left prior to and immediately after independence.<sup>84</sup> It is impossible to quantify the amount of capital they took with them, but its withdrawal coincided with the period of greatest depression in the mines.<sup>85</sup> Without foreign capital, therefore, Mexico could hardly have recovered from depression. This came mainly from Britain, partly in the form of loans, partly by investments of mining companies. The first Mexican loan for £3.2 million was negotiated with Goldschmidt and Co. in 1824, the second for the same amount with Barclay, Herring and Co. in 1825; but Mexico received less than half these sums, and both companies failed, Goldschmidt in 1826, Barclay in 1828. Mining investment was also risky. By 1826 the mines had still made no returns, though the capital employed in working them produced beneficial results in adjacent agriculture, trade and employment. What was desperately needed, however, was the produce of the mines themselves.

The social revolution of 1810 caused a swift exodus of wealthy capitalists from the mining towns. The mines were abandoned and in many cases flooded; the machinery was allowed to deteriorate, and the silver raised was merely the gleanings left over from more prosperous times. But the greatest disaster was again the flight of capital, withdrawn as soon as the insurgents cut communications between Mexico City and the provinces. As the mining towns were usually surrounded by guerrillas, it was impossible for the mines to receive supplies or make remittances without the protection of a large and costly escort. So it was less the material destruction, which could have been repaired, than the loss of confidence and therefore of investment, which produced the collapse of the Mexican mining economy, and with it the depression of agriculture and trade and the dispersion of skilled labour. This was one of the most crucial problems facing the national government after 1821.

Mining policy developed under pressure from Lucas Alamán, who came from a successful mining family in colonial Guanajuato. In an attempt to reduce costs for the industry the government abolished the mercury and mint monopoly of Mexico City, and in 1821 taxes on production and export were reduced to a single 3 per cent duty on gold and silver. To attract essential capital a law of 7 October 1823 threw open the door to foreigners who were allowed to become joint proprietors with Mexicans on highly favourable terms. By 1827 there were seven British companies, one German and two American. British

capital amounted to £3 million, and altogether about twelve million dollars were invested. Within a short period of time a classical story unfolded—optimism, boom and crash. At the root of the problem lay the relative meagreness of the capital invested, which amounted to no more than one-third of the previous Spanish investment, and which was cut short by the financial crisis in London in 1826. Investors were almost completely ignorant of conditions in Mexico and even of the sites of workable mines. The only source of information was Humboldt, excellent for the state of the industry twenty years previously. The English imagined that flooding and labour were the only obstacles and easily surmountable, the former by English machinery, the latter by Cornish miners. The machinery failed and the Cornishmen did not adapt, and the experience caused most of the companies to acknowledge disaster, retrace their steps and start all over again, using European management and local labour. But there was no silver boom in the 1820s. In 1826 the produce of the Mexican mines was 7.5 million dollars.<sup>86</sup> The oligarchy would have to rely on other sources of wealth.

Mexican society retained its immutable form, for independence had certain built-in safeguards against change. A contemporary writer described an imaginary group of people in a bar criticizing independence for giving nothing to the masses: 'Independence is only a name. Previously they ruled us from Spain, now from here. It is always the same priest on a different mule. But as for work, food and clothing, there is no difference.'<sup>87</sup> Privilege survived intact. The Church retained its *fueros* and its wealth, living to fight and to be fought another day. National governments regarded this great complex of ecclesiastical interests with a mixture of alarm and envy. The subsequent attack on Church wealth came from conservatives as well as liberals, for conservative governments represented land-owners who were frequently in debt to the Church and sought release from their liabilities. But it was the Mexican liberals who were to launch the most extensive onslaught on clerical property; and they gave the conflict a new dimension by identifying the Church as an obstacle to economic development and social change. On the eve of the great confrontation, in 1856, the maximum figure of Church property was one hundred million pesos, an immense sum, though one which represented not half the national wealth, as has usually been asserted, but perhaps a fifth or a quarter.<sup>88</sup>

The army also retained its *fueros*. But unlike the Church, with which it is often compared, it was not independent of the state, for it relied upon impoverished and sometimes liberal governments for its income. In 1821 there was a standing army of thirty-

five thousand, 'if so incongruous a mass might be called an army'.<sup>89</sup> This was an amalgamation of patriot and viceregal forces, and to integrate them into a loyal body Iturbide was lavish with officer promotions. In promoting so many officers to very high rank he helped to create an institution which was difficult to control. The Bishop of Puebla described the national army as 'a body in itself so powerful that it might dictate whatever terms it chose'.<sup>90</sup> And although this army provided the sanction behind the liberating plans of Iguala and Casa Mata, it remained in fact a highly conservative force. Of the hundred and eighteen high ranking officers—between general and colonel—listed in 1840, twenty-five had been born in Spain or in one of the Spanish colonies, eighty-one had been born in Mexico but begun their military career in the royalist army, and only twelve (born in Mexico) had served in the insurgent armies.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless the army was not entirely comparable to the other two power bases in Mexico: unlike the Church and the land-owners, it did not possess an independent source of wealth; it was therefore tempted to seek short-cuts to influence and affluence by periodically seizing power in military golpes.

The hacendados owned immense estates and sometimes mines. They depended on personal service for cheap labour, and at independence they opposed the demands of reformers for abolition of forced labour. In 1821 the latifundists urged the regency to repeal the colonial laws protecting the Indians, which they described as an obstacle to the progress of agriculture. A few days after the entry of the trigarantine army in the capital the landowners of Puebla proclaimed: 'The greatest service the government could render to agriculture would be to observe and remedy the present disorder among the Indians, who on the pretext of their misery have been granted a protection which is harmful to themselves, to farmers and to agriculture'.<sup>92</sup> The agrarian system continued to be weighted in favour of monopoly landowners, as can be seen in criticisms made by contemporary reformers: 'A rich man takes possession of all the land round a village and imposes his own law there, so that the dependent inhabitants are forced by necessity to enter into tenancies and other arrangements under highly unfavourable conditions'.<sup>93</sup> Campesinos were held dependent either by semi-servile rentals paid in labour or by debt peonage. Hacienda peons received only one peso a week and a small ration of maize and beans. 'This miserable wage, combined with the high cost of living, means that most of them are enslaved to the hacendado, who thus believes himself authorized to commit the greatest excesses. The peon cannot leave to work for

another master, for it is asserted that the debts they have incurred can only be paid by labour. For one peso owed they get eight days in the hacienda lock-up, and if they are late for work they can get a light penalty—staked out on their backs in the open for twenty-four hours'.<sup>94</sup>

The defeat of Morelos ended any chance of agrarian reform. After 1821 a few tentative efforts were made towards land distribution, inspired by liberal followers of Jovellanos, the distinguished Spanish advocate of agrarian reform. In 1823 congress ordered distribution of land on the hacienda of San Lorenzo in Chachapalcingo, Puebla. In 1827 Lorenzo Zavala divided Indian lands of forty settlements in the state of Mexico. And in 1829 Francisco García, Governor of Zacatecas, created a bank to acquire land for distribution in perpetual tenancies to landless peasants, and even tried to apply a local law of disentail. But these measures only skirted the problem. And when in 1833 the liberal party issued a policy statement urging the distribution of land to the rural poor, it included the important proviso 'without invading or violating the rights of private owners'.<sup>95</sup>

Independence gave all Mexicans equality of rights and status. There were few slaves in Mexico; in 1821, according to the commission on slavery, there were less than three thousand, and these were concentrated in the ports of Veracruz, Acapulco and other coastal areas. Abolition was announced in the Plan of Iguala, and there was little difficulty in implementing it. On 13 September 1821 the slave trade into Mexico was prohibited, and all persons born in Mexico were declared free. These measures were confirmed and extended by the constitutional regime. The federal government prohibited the slave trade on 13 October 1824. Various state laws of abolition were passed between 1825 and 1827; and President Guerrero suppressed slavery for the whole of Mexico on 15 September 1829.<sup>96</sup>

Abolition completed a process of emancipation which had been accelerated in the course of the eighteenth century, when slave labour became too expensive and many ex-slaves came on the free labour market, joining those Negroes who had already gained freedom through grant, or purchase, or escape. Slavery disappeared even in the plantation sector, and many of the largest sugar estates in Cuernavaca had gone over to free labour by 1808. The high costs, uncertain supply and heavy mortality were the major inducements: 'Several of the great proprietors were induced by these circumstances, to give liberty to a certain number of their slaves annually, and by encouraging marriages between them and the Indians of the country, to propagate a race of free labourers, who might be employed when a

supply of slaves was no longer to be obtained.<sup>97</sup> Land-owners therefore had already insured against abolition. But what of the ex-slave? In the colonial period the emancipated Negro had to perform military service, register with the *caja de negros* and pay tribute like Indians. They remained, with the mulattos, on the margin of society, without a caste or a place, squatting on the fringes of haciendas, crowding into *palenques*, living a vagrant existence in the towns. Independence gave them at least an identity: they were now Mexicans.<sup>98</sup> They wanted more, of course; the mixed bloods in particular desired to advance and exploit the opportunities theoretically open to them in a liberal society. But they had to be satisfied with a declaration that classification of persons by the terms Spaniard, Indian, mulatto and other racial descriptions would not be permitted in official documents, as everyone was now Mexican.<sup>99</sup>

The Indians could not be abolished by decree. The tribute, the traditional mark of servitude, was now suppressed. But this still left the problem of how to define an Indian. Race was not enough: in 1826 the senate of Jalisco argued that since few 'pureblooded Indians' remained, those whom 'public opinion' considered Indians would be regarded as such. The influence of the latifundists and the search for dependent labour conditioned the policy of the liberals towards the Indians, and behind their overtly egalitarian views lurked hacendado thinking. Immediately after independence the land-owners demanded that indebted Indians be obliged to remain on the haciendas, arguing that as free and equal citizens the Indians could make enforceable contracts. Mora argued that the new legislation replaced the old distinction between Indians and non-Indians with a new division between rich and poor, 'thereby extending to everyone the benefits of society'.<sup>100</sup> The liberal ideal of equality among all citizens was

responsible for grave errors in the development of Indian and agrarian policy, errors which the conservatives were too complacent to correct. Carlos María Bustamante was an exception who saw the danger: 'I think I hear people say that there are no Indians any more, that we are all Mexicans. . . . This sounds like a brave illusion to me, an illusion to remedy real and serious ills. . . . No Indians exist any more but the same needs from which the Indians suffered still exist.'<sup>101</sup> In their own interests the creoles had to take the tension out of the colonial caste system by abolishing its legal framework and substituting social and racial equality. The new stratification by class, while introducing a modicum of mobility, maintained basic differences and preserved creole superiority. Few Indians—Benito Juárez was to be one—were able to profit from the new mobility. The protected or 'caste' status which the Indians possessed in colonial society helped to ensure the continuity of their culture. Now, in a 'free' society based not on legally defined divisions but on class, the Indians were unable to integrate themselves into the nation. They remained a separate group, concentrated in those parts of the country which offered them a place of refuge, and protected, for the moment, by their community lands. This was what they preferred. But they were not to be left alone, for the very existence of community lands was anathema to liberal individualism. So the Indians faced independence in a vulnerable position, with little faith in the whites. In 1824 a clerical member of the Veracruz congress described the Indians to an English observer as 'downright savages, who had successfully resisted every attempt to educate them. An Indian was asked whom he wished should represent him or his nation in the congress. After some thought he answered "the Holy Ghost".'<sup>102</sup> To the Indians God was not white.

## ENDNOTES

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 215-19.
4. Victoria Lerner, 'La población de la Nueva España (1793-1810)', *Historia Mexicana*, xvii (1968), 327-46; Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, pp. 224-5.
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10. Humboldt, *Ensayo político*, ii, 50-88.
11. See above, p. 23.
12. Humboldt, *Ensayo político*, ii, 149.
13. Romeo Flores Caballero, *La contra-revolución en la independencia. Los españoles en la vida política, social y económica de México (1804-1838)* (Mexico, 1969), p. 22.
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52. Morelos, 21 November 1813, Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, pp. 439-41.
53. Morelos, 24 November 1811, 8 February *ibid.*, pp. 184-5, 190.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-8.
55. Bando de Morelos, 17 November 1810, *ibid.*, p. 162.
56. Alamán alleged that Morelos was a socialist waging class war for the destruction and redistribution of property. For the fullest discussion of this problem see Timmons, *Morelos*, pp. 101-3, and 'José María Morelos—Agrarian Reformer?' *HAHR*, xlv (1965), 183-95, who emphasizes the immediate politico-military objects of the *Medidas Políticas* and attributes authorship to the *Guadalupes*, not Morelos. See also Teja Zabre, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-15.
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91. María del Carmen Velázquez, 'Nueva estructura social en Hispanoamérica después de la independencia', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, 5 (1968), 264-81, especially p. 279, n.21.
92. Quoted by Ocampo, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
93. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 259.
94. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 261.
95. Jesús Reyes Heróles, *El liberalismo mexicano* (3 vols, Mexico, 1957-61), ii, 177; see also Luis González, 'El agrarismo liberal', *Historia Mexicana*, vii (1958), 469-96.
96. Moisés González Navarro, *Raza y Tierra* (Mexico, 1970), pp. 50-1; Ocampo, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-6.
97. Ward to Canning, 13 March 1826, P.R.O., F.O. 50/20.
98. Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, 'The Integration of the Negro into the National Society of Mexico', Magnus Mörner (ed.), *Race and Class in Latin America* (New York, 1970) 11-29.
99. Constituent Congress, 27 September 1822, Moisés González Navarro, 'Instituciones indígenas en México independiente', *Métodos y resultados de la política indigenista en México* (Mexico, 1954), pp. 115-30, 143-65; Magnus Mörner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America* (Boston, 1967), p. 83.
100. Quoted by Moisés González Navarro, 'Mestizaje in Mexico during the national period', Mörner, *Race and Class in Latin America*, p. 147.
101. Debate, 1824, cited by Mörner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America*, p. 104.
102. Morier to Canning, 19 November 1824, P.R.O. F.O. 50/6.